Defence of Angie Zelter

Argyll & Bute District Court, Victoria Halls, Helensburgh, 22nd September 1998 0.1 Charge:- On the 13th and also on the 20th August 1998 ’in HMNB, Clyde, Argyll and Bute, you Angela Christine Zelter’ with various others, different on the two occasions ’did without reasonable excuse, wilfully or recklessly destroy or damage the property belonging to another viz perimeter fence by cutting said fence; contrary to the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995. Section 52(1)’; and ’you did enter by land the Protected Area at Faslane other than by way of an authorised entry, namely through a hole in the perimeter fence; contrary to the Faslane, Coulport and Rhu Byelaws 1986, Byelaw 2 and the Military Lands Act 1892, Section 14’. 0.2 Having pled NOT GUILTY I would like to avail myself of the following defences:-

– Common Law Defences of necessity and self defence and also an ancient Gaelic Law of Adomnan. – Statutory Defence that authorises me to act if I have a ’reasonable excuse’. – International Law Defence that authorises me to act in order to prevent the commission of crimes recognised under international law. – Moral Defence that is mine as a right as a human being. 0.3 All of these defences require that I go into some detail about my own beliefs that British nuclear weapons are a threat to all life on this planet at every moment, that they are not only staggeringly dangerous but also unethical and illegal. These defences also require that I present testimony to back up my beliefs and show that they are based on rational, objective, factual evidence. It is not the job of this court at this time to judge the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister for planning to commit war crimes nor to rule that British nuclear weapons are unlawful. They are not unfortunately yet on trial. I am and I understand that fully. 0.4 But it is the job of this court to hear testimony and thus to understand why I quite rationally believe that British nuclear weapons are an immediate threat to myself and all life on the planet as well as being illegal because I need to do this in order to avail myself of the various defences open to me to enable me to defend myself against the quite unfair charges brought against me. A superficial and unjust glance at the undisputed facts of this case, which includes the damage I did to the perimeter security fence around the Faslane Base might lead to the wrong conclusion that I was acting without reasonable excuse. The Court is obliged in the interests of justice to listen to my evidence on the illegality and criminality of Trident in order to be able to judge fairly whether I did or did not have a reasonable excuse. 0.5 I therefore ask that justice is seen to be done in this court today and that I am not misdirected to stop giving evidence that is of a legal nature because the prosecution might think it is of a political nature. The International Court of Justice had a similar problem and it may be of use to quote their response to it, ’The fact that this question also has political aspects, as, in the nature of things, is the case with so many questions which arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a ’legal question’’. [ICJ Opinion para.11]

1. Common Law Defences of necessity and self-defence and also an ancient Gaelic Law of Adomnan that has never been repealed. 1.0 Necessity and self-defence.

I wish to run these together as they connect similar principles of law. In Scots law the defence of necessity may be invoked where the accused has done something which is prima facie unlawful but which is justified by the exigencies of the situation. For instance you are permitted to destroy property belonging to a person in order to save his life – by committing a crime you have avoided a greater evil. 1.1 An important case is that of Moss v. Howdle (1997 SCCR 215) where a driver exceeded the speed limits by driving too fast to the nearest service station because his passenger was suffering from severe pains. The defence of necessity was available to this particular defendant and therefore it can be open to me too. In this particular case the court found that the driver could have prudently followed an alternative course of action which would not have involved committing the offence (ie the driver could have pulled over to the side of the road rather than speeding). The court found that the driver had had a real choice and was not constrained to commit the offence and accordingly the defence was not available to him. The Lord Justice-General said ’the defence cannot apply where the circumstances did not in fact constrain the accused to act in breech of the law’. [Moss v. Howdle (1997 SCCR 215) p223 D] 1.2 The minimum requirement of the defence of necessity is:-

-  that the accused acted in the face of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm;
-  that it makes no difference where the danger arises from, it can be from a natural disaster, an illness, from the deliberate threats of another or any other danger;
-  that is open to someone who tries to ensure that others escape immediate danger as well as for protection of oneself; and
-  that there is no other reasonable legal alternative to disobeying the law.

The common law basis for these requirements if laid out extensively in Moss v. Howdle, and I refer the court to this case as justification for the elaboration of this section. 1.3 To take these one by one:- i) I must show that I acted in the face of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm.

Since the question of whether or not there is such a danger is a question of fact and not law, it is of no import to this question as to whether British nuclear weapons are legal or illegal in international law. Even if the use of nuclear weapons were to be perfectly legal which I of course dispute, the viability of this defence is not affected. The ICJ Opinion is of use in this regard, not as a statement of law but as an authoritative and comprehensive review of the effects of nuclear weapons upon human life, health and habitat and I recommend to the Magistrate the copy of Weeramantry’s Opinion appended to the ICJ Opinion as it includes a detailed review of the current dangers of nuclear weapons. 1.4 I also presented in the witness box material to show that accidents are happening all the time, that radioactive material is being leaked and vented routinely and that the environment is becoming steadily contaminated with long lasting radioactive elements that are harming all of us greatly, especially indigenous people whose native land has been poisoned by mining uranium and the testing of nuclear bombs. They certainly do not concur that the last 50 years of nuclear weapons have kept the peace. Their testimony is heartbreaking as they struggle to live with the genetic malformations caused by the criminal negligence of the nuclear powers. 1.5 And there is no escaping now that most of us will be experiencing these malformations and this long term genetic damage as well as increased cancers and health problems from the most recent nuclear military accident on August 13th this year. The failed Titan launch of the Vortex military space command satellite may have contained 20 pounds of plutonium in the fuel cell. When the launch went wrong it was destroyed to reduce it to particulate matter a technique used in the past to try to cover up the plutonium power source. It has been recognised that the public would be appalled to know of these Chernobyl’s being launched in the skies overhead. However, a shocked project engineer has begun to leak out the information of this accident, which may prove to be the largest nuclear accident in the history of the USA. The medical consequences of this military accident are too horrific to take in at present. The 2.5 pounds of plutonium, that was vaporised when the Russian space probe crashed to earth in Northern Canada on 21st April 1964 is known to be the cause of the massive increase in lung and breast cancers that have occurred globally. So twenty pounds of this deadly substance could be the death knoll of the human race, all in the name of defence. It is important to take in that there are more missile warning satellites due to be launched, that these are connected to our Trident system and that more accidents will happen if we do not take action now. It is the responsibility of everyone in this court room to understand what is going on and do everything in their power to disarm these systems. 1.6 I also presented to you evidence to show that at any moment an accidental launch of nuclear weapons could happen and thus I am in immediate danger from this too. The fact that we have nuclear weapons ready to use and a nuclear deterrent policy means that other countries have theirs ready to use – which multiplies the risk. I am not alone, many millions of people all over the world feel threatened and unsafe, they certainly do not feel protected. 1.7

ii) It makes no difference where the danger arises from, it can be from a natural disaster, and illness, from the deliberate threats of another or any other danger.

Thus the dangers from nuclear weapons and from our own Governments ’defence’ policies are also a valid danger that can be included in this defence of necessity. 1.8

iii) It is open to me to try to ensure that others escape immediate danger as well as for me to protect myself.

The Lord Justice-General’s judgement in Moss v. Howdle said, The law recognises that ’’Danger invites rescue’ in Scotland … Scots law has never been so mean spirited as to confine the defence of self–defence to situations where the accused acts to save himself. It has always recognised that the defence may be available in situations where the accused acts in an altruistic fashion to save a companion’ [Moss v Howdle (1997 SCCR 215) p222 E). I therefore wish to avail myself of this in that I do care that people in countries other than ours feel threatened with mass destruction and might be bombed and annihilated by the use of one of the 100 Kt warheads from a British Trident submarine. My act was not merely to save myself but to save others. 1.9

iv) I have to show that there is no other reasonable legal alternative to disobeying the law.

The Lord Justice-General stated in Moss v. Howdle, ’The question to be asked is whether the agent had any real choice: could he have done otherwise? If there is a reasonable legal alternative to disobeying the law, then the decision to disobey becomes a voluntary one, impelled by some contention beyond the dictates of ’necessity’ and human instincts’. 1.10 I would also like to refer to Gordon on Criminal Law where he discusses necessity, ’If obedience to the Law were regarded as a supreme value, there would be no room for the Plea Of Necessity at all, since it would not be possible for a breach of the Law to be more valuable than one which did not involve such a breach … There seems to be no good reason for regarding legal rules as categorical, or as being all of equal value – there is no more reason why some legal rules should not be regarded as more important than others, or why in some cases other considerations should not allow a legal rule to be broken. The law is not the embodiment of absolute wisdom but merely a means of social control, and it would be socially disadvantageous, for example, to prevent the preservation of a building by action involving the theft of a ladder and fire extinguisher.’ How much more disadvantageous it would be to prevent the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction involving property damage! [G.H.Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland, 1978, Ch 13, p 419]. 1.11 In my case there was no reasonable legal alternative to breaking the law. As pointed out in some detail in the witness box, I and many millions of other people have tried every legal method possible over the last 50 years to persuade governments to disarm their nuclear weapons. There seems to be no other effective way, other than safe and nonviolent direct disarmament, of ridding the world of this terrible danger that is already causing radioactive contamination around the world, creating genetic and immunity damage to all life forms. 1.12 On the question specifically of my entitlement to self defence it should be noted that I am allowed to defend my right to life and a secure and humane future by using imaginative and creative means.. I am constrained in the methods I can use in exactly the same way as our Government is also constrained to restrict the amount of damage done when it exercises its right to self defence. As I am using very gentle, open, accountable, safe and nonviolent methods I contend that the method of disarmament to protect life, as well as the life of others, is certainly reasonable in the context of the threat of mass destruction. 1.13 One further point on this question of self-defence. I have been advised by no less a person than Colonel Dunlap – the US Staff Judge Advocate of the US Strategic Command – that the USA reserves the right to target civilian populations and that ’people have a duty to restrain their government from committing nuclear aggression and if they fail in that duty, their absolute immunity as non-combatants is undermined’ [Taming Shiva: Applying International Law to Nuclear Operations – Dunlap. Air Force Law Review/1997]. I have taken this very much to heart. This is one of the most senior legal advisers to the US Command who control NATO of which the UK is a part and to which British nuclear weapons are committed. Although I do not believe that we can lose our immunity under international law just like that, I do realise that such statements put out a terrible message to all the nuclear powers who might thus feel able to target others in nuclear weapon states who are unable to persuade their governments not to use nuclear weapons. And the salient point is that whether he is right or wrong in international law he obviously thinks this is the case and is therefore likely to act upon his own belief. I therefore have even more justification for taking action to encourage practical and effective nuclear disarmament. 1.14 Cain Adomnan

Before I move on to the international Law Defence it may be of use and relevance to this court to hear about an ancient Gaelic law that has never, as far as I am aware, been repealed. It was an early attempt to limit the effects of war by protecting non-combatants – women, children and clerics. It as, if you like, a very early Scottish ancestor of the laws of war. 1.15 Called Adomnan’s Law of the Innocents, after the 7th century Abbot of Iona who devised and promulgated it, it forbids assaults on women and prescribes dreadful punishments for the murder of children, women and clerics in time of war. For example section 33 reads ’For whoever kills a woman is condemned to a double punishment, ie. his right hand and his left foot are cut off before death and then he shall die, and his relations pay seven full ancillae and a seven of the penance’ [Adomnan’s Law of the Innocents, Gilbert Marcus OP, 1997]. Unlike most early Gaelic law, Cain law as a form of law which was promulgated as the act of a legislator, with tributes and fines payable to the authority which promulgated it. The law was supported by payments of goods, and violations were punished by payment f valuables to Adomnan’s community. The closely associated monastery of Raphoe in Donegal then took this responsibility over and it is here that the text of the law can be found. 1.16 The text of the law includes a list of Kings who had accepted it. This list indicates that the law was recognised not only in Ireland but across the large proportion of Scotland. It would appear that the law was recognised for at least two centuries. Walkers Legal History of Scotland noes that in 727 ’The relics of Adomnan are brought over to Ireland and the law is received’ and in 929 there was a procurator for the law of Adomnan at the Columban monastery in Derry [A legal History of Scotland, David M. Walker, 1988. p12]. 1.17 The Principles of the Law of Adomnan can be seen reflected in the ’Peace of God’ which was promoted in continental Europe in the 10th and 11th Centuries. The ’Peace of God’ sought to protect non-combatants in war. This listed clerics, women and children as in Adomnan’s law, but also included the aged, agricultural workers and the poor. Consequently the principle of non-combatant immunity was included in Canon Law and as such had a place in the European legal framework over many centuries [M.Keen. The Law of War in the Early Middle Ages]. The immunity of non-combatants in time of war has continued to be recognised in legislation in recent centuries. It is clarified in the Geneva Convention Protocols of 1977 which the UK government ratified this year. These firmly restate that civilians should not be the object of attack and recognise that women and children ’shall be the object of respect’ [Geneva Convention Additional Protocol 1, 1977, Articles 76 and 77]. 1.18 It is clear that there is a close association between national and international law development especially in regard to war that crosses national borders. Nation States come and go – just look at the history of state formation and change in Europe in the last 100 years – but the necessity to protect ordinary people, the land and the environment from lasting damage and death is so important that over the centuries a whole body of law has evolved to this effect. If at first glance this Court finds it difficult to accept the relevance of international humanitarian law in this court in Helensburgh, only a few miles from Faslane, where the British nuclear weapons are based, then maybe this short foray into Scottish legal history will assist. 1.19 Scotland prides itself that it has a legal system that is based upon principles. If a legal system based upon principles cannot deal justly with global citizens who are trying to prevent mass destruction then it has failed abysmally and we have learnt nothing through the centuries. Even if the court does not accept the evidence that I wish to give to it that international humanitarian law must be considered in interpreting Scottish law where relevant, the Court must accept that the targeting of non-combatants is unlawful according to Scottish common law.

1.20 I therefore ask the court to acquit me under Common Law.

2. Statutory Defence that authorises me to act is I have a ’reasonable excuse’. 2.0 I have been charged that I did ’without reasonable excuse, wilfully or recklessly destroy or damage the property belonging to another’. 2.1 I am not going to dispute the fact that I damaged property belonging to another although it is arguable whether property which has been designed, produced and deployed with the express purpose of mass destruction has a right to be protected in law. 2.2 I will deal instead with the issues involved in showing that I had reasonable excuse. To do this I need to show the following elements:-

-  that preventing a crime is a reasonable excuse in Scottish Law;
-  that international law (and thus international crime) is relevant to Scottish Law;
-  that the threat and use of Trident nuclear weapons is a crime in international law;
-  that I not only honestly believe that this crime was being committed but that the crime was actually in fact being committed;
-  that there was a practical link between my action and the prevention of crime and that this action would actually help to prevent crime;
-  that my action was reasonable in the circumstances and that I could not do anything else effective to prevent the crime.


i) Preventing a crime is a reasonable excuse in Scottish Law.

In Scottish Law the belief that one is preventing or halting a greater crime is a reasonable excuse when charged with offences against property. 2.4 I would like to bring to the Court’s attention the case of MacDougall v Yuk-Sun Ho (1985 S.C.C.R 199) where the Lord Justice General allowed ’reasonable excuse’ to apply to damaging property to prevent the escape of a man thought (incorrectly as it happens) to be a criminal. The accused had damaged a car windscreen in an attempt to prevent the escape of occupants believed by him to be responsible for damaging his shop window. The central element in Ho’s acquittal was his sincere belief that he was preventing the perpetrators of an unlawful action from escaping regardless of whether or not his actual target was correct. The rationale underlying his acquittal is put quite succinctly in the last few lines of the final paragraph of the Case Stated where it says, ’allowing for …his desire to stop the perpetrators of the offence from getting away…it has not been shown that …..there was no reasonable excuse in all the circumstances’. 2.5 Now, I am arguing that the present deployment of Trident is an unlawful threat in itself, now at this moment while we speak, but even if this were not the case and I was saying that I wanted to prevent the future crime of actual use of Trident nuclear warheads I could also cite this case in my defence as it would be logical and consistent with this judgement to also allow measures to prevent such a crime from taking place in the first place. 2.6

ii) International Law (and thus international crime) is relevant to Scottish Law.

For this defence, of reasonable excuse, it is necessary to determine whether the activities, that my intended act of disarmament, was aimed at preventing or halting, would be recognised as criminal actions in international law and whether international law can be taken in account in Scottish Courts. 2.7 The position of the Scottish Courts is that customary international law id part of Scottish law, although in case of a conflict with a statute or precedent, that statute or precedent must prevail. It is to be noted that for vandalism, there is no legislative guidance on the meaning of ’reasonable excuse’, therefore it is quite valid to look to customary international law to determine the meaning of the phrase. The position of the Scottish Courts is that customary international law is part of Scottish law, although the case of a conflict with a statute or precedent , that state or precedent must prevail. 2.8 In the famous Mortensen v. Peters case (1906 14 S.L.T 227), which is often misread to indicate that international law is not applicable in the Scottish Courts Lord Kyllachy stated that ’there is always a certain presumption against the Legislature of a country asserting or assuming the existence of territorial jurisdiction going clearly beyond limits established by the common consent of nations – that is to say by International Law’. It was indicated that when it cannot be said that the Scottish statute contains ’express words’ or there is ’plain implication’, international law is of use in determining the meaning of the legislation (or common law). In this way, international law can have a highly significant role in Scottish courts.. 2.9 Professor Ian Brownlie, Q.C. says that ’customary international rules are to be considered part of the law of the land and enforced as such’ [Principles of Public International Law, Ian Brownlie, 1979, 3rd Edition, p4]. 2.10 Lord Murray, a previous Lord Advocate of Scotland, in a paper published in May 1998 and entitled ’Can Trident missiles be lawfully used in the light of the decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Case?’ starts off by stating ’International Law, despite any appearance to the contrary, is real law, not just international morality or international expediency’. I put this quote in especially for the Procurator Fiscal as he told me in a previous case that in his opinion International Law was not real law! 2.11 The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the most authoritative interpretation of current customary international law as it applies to nuclear weapons and is thus of exceptional relevance to this court. The War Crimes Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are explicitly based on, and have articulated, customary international law as it stands today relating to humanitarian law, are all of relevance as well. The international laws that I rely upon in this case are applicable to every nation and every individual within these nations regardless of their nationalistic blusterings as to the contrary. 2.12

iii) that the threat or use of Trident nuclear weapons is a crime in international law.

The Advisory Opinion of the ICJ of 8th July 1996 is very clear on the sources of international law as they relate to nuclear weapons and they may be briefly summarised as follows:-

-  Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868

Avoidance and, in any event minimising incidental loss of civilian life.

Not causing unnecessary suffering.
-  Hague Convention, 1907.

Not causing unnecessary suffering,

Inviolability of neutral nations

Applications of the provisions to new technologies (Martens Clause)
-  Nuremburg Principles, 1946.

Personal culpability of individuals including heads of state for crimes against the peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
-  Genocide Convention, 1948

Prohibition of Genocide
-  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

Right to life and health.
-  Geneva Conventions, 1949

Protection of the wounded, sick, the infirm, expectant mothers, civilian hospitals and health workers.
-  Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968.

Immunity of non-nuclear nations from nuclear attack.
-  Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977.

Compliance of armed forces with international law.

2.13 Moreover, do not forget that two of these conventions have been directly brought into the UK system through the Genocide Act of 1948 and the Geneva Convention Act of 1949. Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland cites both of these as International Laws having jurisdiction within the Scottish Courts [Criminal Law of Scotland, G.H. Gordon, 2nd Ed., 1978, p834]. 2.14 These sources, taken together, form the core elements of modern customary international law binding in the UK., as the UK has not persistently objected to being bound by them. In fact, the UK has consistently agreed that these treaties do indeed form a part of general customary law, and has endorsed decisions buy international tribunals in which their customary status was affirmed. 2.15 For example:-

-  the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal (IMT) where violations of the 1929 Geneva convention constituted a war crime [Bishop, International Law: Cases and Materials, pp 1014-5];
-  the decision of the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) in the Tadic case of 1997 on violations of common article 3 of the 4 Geneva Conventions;
-  the justification of the UK Government for the 1980 War Crimes Act, whereby World War II suspects could be tried without breaching the principle of non-retroactivity because these acts were customary law crimes in 1945. [The customary status of such crime is reviewed by T. Meron, in 89 AmJ. Intl L. 554, 1995]. 2.16 The preparation for war crimes is itself a crime, as made most explicit in the International Criminal Court (ICC) statute Article 25 (3). ’In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:…(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission’ [UN Doc. No. A/CONF. 183/9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court]. 2.17 This is a culmination of various precedents like the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Charter of the IMT at Nuremburg on … ’instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation…of a common plan or conspiracy’; Nuremburg Principle VII on complicity; the trials of industrial leaders in Germany and Japan at the WWII Tribunals: and Article 7 (1) of the Statute of the ICTFY. 2.18 These international laws are being used at this very time to try war crimes in Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia. These customary laws are binding on all states at all times. It would be the height of ignorance, arrogance and injustice to think that they do not apply to the people and Government of the UK and cannot be cited in my defence in a Scottish Court. 2.19

The threat and use of Trident nuclear weapons is a crime in international law

Use of British nuclear weapons would constitute a war crime as determined by Article 8 (2) (b) parts iv, and v, of the ICC statute. ’War crimes means…serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts;…(iv) Intentional launching an attack in the knowledge that such an attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; (v) Attacking or bombarding. by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives’ [UN Doc. No A/CONF.183/9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court]. 2.20 It might be well to note that the only case ever brought on behalf of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in the Shimoda case, successfully argued that the bombings breached international law and were in effect war crimes [Shimoda Case]. 2.21 The criminal activities that I was trying to prevent were the deployment, threat and use of British nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister and other officers of the state are engaged in planning and deploying nuclear weapons – activities that incur individual criminal responsibility in international law. Any use of British nuclear weapons would be manifestly unlawful and current policy makers and state employees at Faslane and Coulport are engaged in planning and preparation of gross violations of customary humanitarian law, itself a crime under international law. 2.22 The ICJ Advisory Opinion specified that ’the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law’ [Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, 105 2E]. The ICJ Opinion also envisioned no circumstances under which the use of nuclear weapons would not violate international humanitarian law saying ’none of the states advocating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances, including the ’clean’ use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons, has indicated what, supposing such limited use were feasible, would be the precise circumstances justifying such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high yield weapons’ [Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, 94]. 2.23 Given that the British Government have never explained to the ICJ nor to the British public how they could possibly use their nuclear weapons legally – they haven’t even been able to outline one hypothetical example – but in fact have been extremely careful to say that they could never foresee the precise circumstances and could therefore not determine the legality until the time came to use them – I think it is quite clear that they are unable and unwilling to open themselves up to proper legal scrutiny. The form of words the Government usually use goes like this ’the legality or otherwise of any specific use of any nuclear weapons…can only be determined in the light of all the circumstances applying at the time such use is being considered. It is impossible to anticipate in advance with any confidence the exact circumstances which might arise, and to speculate on particular hypothetical cases would serve no purpose’ [Letter to Angie Zelter of 23/10/97 from Hazel Finch of Ministry of Defence]. 2.24 It is of course ludicrous to think that, if no such legal scrutiny and exercises had taken place before, that any thorough legal scrutiny of an actual use of nuclear weapons could take place in the heat of a war of self-defence in which the very survival of Britain might be at stake. And according to the ICJ opinion this is the only circumstance in which the use of nuclear weapons might justifiably be used. The fact that the British Government can come up with no hypothetical cases that could be presented into the public domain for legal scrutiny by the world community suggests that there are none. 2.25 The only possible lawful use, and thus lawful threat, of nuclear weapons by a state might possibly, but not definitely even then, be ’in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake’ [Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, 97]. However, it is significant that the President of the ICJ stated that this ’cannot in any way be interpreted as a half-open door to the recognition of the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons’ [President Bedjaoui, Separate Statement appended to the Advisory opinion ,11) 2.26 The Government clearly recognises that the UK is in no danger of a threat to ’its very survival’. The Strategic Defence Review conducted by the Government states, ’The end of the Cold War has transformed our security environment. The world does not live in the Shadow of World War. There is no longer a direct threat to Western Europe or the United Kingdom as we used to know it, and we face no significant military threat to any of our Overseas Territories’ [UK Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, Ch. 2.23 and 3.56 ]. As the survival of Britain is not presently under threat, the present deployment of Trident submarines carrying nuclear weapons is an unlawful threat. It is as unlawful as it would be for the Procurator Fiscal to go out into the streets of Helensburgh right now with a loaded hand-gun. 2.27 Moreover, British nuclear policy is not purely concerned with self-defence or even with retaliation against nuclear attack from other nuclear weapon states but is also to defend our ’vital interests to the utmost’ as expressed in the Rifkind Doctrine [Tactical Trident, the Rifkind Doctrine and the Third World, Milan Rai]. Chapter 5 of the Strategic Defence Review sees military power as ’a coercive instrument to support political objectives’ which the rest of the report explicitly identifies as economic and oil-related. Britain aligns itself with the US in all its defence policies and uses its nuclear weapons to warn other weaker countries not to disobey US-UK guidelines (such as the recent US nuclear threat against Libya over the Tarhuna site). This is unlawful. On Tuesday 17th Feb, in the Commons Iraq Crisis Debate, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said that Saddam ’should be in no doubt’ that if he were to use chemical weapons against air strikes ’there would be a proportionate response’. Foreign Office sources said later that the US response to a chemical attack on its forces by Iraq would be ’devastating’. One official added ’In the cold war the standard NATO response to Soviets use of chemical or biological weapons would have been tactical nuclear weapons’. Many commentators interpreted Robin Cook’s remarks as a threat to use British nuclear weapons and this is reinforced when in the evening of the same day HMS Vanguard (one of the Trident subs) left Faslane on and unscheduled patrol. Such British nuclear threats are unlawful. 2.28 Also, implicit in the Court’s statement where the wording is its very survival’ is that a state cannot use nuclear weapons to protect another state whose survival is at stake. UK and NATO policy remains that nuclear weapons could be used in collective self defence. In other words, the UK’s reservation of her right to use nuclear weapons in defence of other states, such as when Iraq invaded Kuwait, is a violation of international law. 2.29 A threat or use of nuclear weapons must ’be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflicts’ [Advisory opinion of ICJ, 105 2D]. The Court confirmed that ’States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets…States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use’, [Advisory opinion of ICJ, 8]. The threat to target civilians whether as an unprovoked attack or as a reprisal is therefore unlawful. In the oral statement that the UK gave to the Court on 15th November 1995, Sir Nicholas Lyell stated that ’ …even a military target must not be attacked if to do so would cause collateral civilian casualties or damage to civilian property which is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack’ [CR 95/34, p.47]. Trident warheads of 100 Kt are too powerful to distinguish between civilian and military targets and their long lasting effects cannot be contained in space nor in time and therefore violate international law. 2.30 We are not as constrained as the ICJ which was asked to consider a general question and did not have the ’elements of facts at its disposal’ [Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, 97] to enable it to be more specific. We re able to look at the specific facts of the British nuclear system and can thus judge whether 48 100 Kt or even one 100 Kt nuclear warhead could be used legally according to the principles and interpretation of the ICJ Opinion. 2.31 In the witness box I presented to you the grounds for my honest belief that the British Nuclear Trident System is an immediate and ongoing danger to all life on the planet, a threat to international peace and is unlawful within the terms of the ICJ opinion, and I would like to summarise them again to you very briefly. 2.32

a) Faslane is home to the British nuclear armed Trident submarines. There is always one Trident submarine on 24 hour patrol at all times. Each Trident submarine has 48 warheads of from 100-120 kilotons. 100 kilotons is eight times the yield of the Hiroshima bomb. 140, 000 innocent children, women and men lost their lives as a result of the Hiroshima bomb. To put it into a current perspective the one tonne of Semtex killed several hundred people in Nairobi and the 500 lbs of ammonium nitrate killed 28 in Omagh – the explosive forces of one Trident warhead is equivalent to 100,000 tonnes of chemical explosive [The Medical Consequences of Trident – Douglas Holdstock Msc MD FRCP, September 1998]. 2.33

b) For a 100 Kt Trident warhead the lethal area of its blast effect alone is 71 square kilometres – this means a city the size of Glasgow would suffer several hundred thousand fatalities from head, spinal and other forms of trauma, from victims being thrown across buildings and crushed in falling or destroyed buildings. At the centre even reinforced concrete buildings would be flattened, at the edge of the lethal zone ordinary houses destroyed, and appreciably further out there would be many thousands of injuries from flying glass. The heat effects create an intense flash of heat and light, which can cause fatal full-thickness 3rd degree flash burns on exposed skin within about the same lethal area as blast. Those facing the detonation could also suffer retinal burns leading to permanent blindness. The radiation effects can also effect civilians far from the intended target and, indeed, the inhabitants of neutral countries. Immediate radiation formed by gamma rays and neutrons produced in the fireball have a lethal zone for a 100 Kt detonation which is slightly smaller that the lethal area from blast and heat and therefore does not add significantly to the fatality rate. However, early fallout is deposited on a cigar-shaped area up to 50 miles long and ten miles wide down-wind of the nuclear explosion depending on wind and causes brain damage, ulceration leading to uncontrollable bleeding and irreversible damage to the bone marrow. Further out damage is still severe and whilst not necessarily fatal leaves a high risk of leukemia and cancer for the rest of the victims life – the children and elderly being the most at risk. Late fallout increases the leukaemia and cancer rates, depressing immunity and increasing the rate of genetic mutations [The Medical Consequences of Trident – Douglas Holdstock Msc MD FRCP, September 1998]. 2.34

c) The effects of the use of nuclear weapons include:-

-  damage to civilian populations including immediate loss of life and injury to long-lasting congenital deformities;
-  damage to other nations including neutral countries because the fall-out cannot be controlled;
-  long-lasting damage to the environment and eco-system effecting food productivity and the natural life support systems;
-  continuing damage to future generations – remembering the half life of one of the by-products, plutonium, is 24,000 years;
-  danger to existing nuclear power stations in the areas targeted which would add to their lethal load of radiation;
-  potential for escalation and thus the destruction of all civilisation;
-  and over all this there is the genocidal mentality that is being engendered in all those who live in a society that relies upon the threat to use unclear weapons of mass destruction. This mentality include using non-feeling language, distancing, ideological ethics and the demonising of enemies such that it encourages people to find acceptable the unacceptable, to justify the killing of thousands and perhaps millions of people within minutes, in retaliation for something their government may or may not have done. [Weeramantry’s dissenting Opinion – July 1996]. 2.35 The ICJ put the matter very succinctly. ’By its very nature… nuclear weapons…release not only immense quantities of heat and energy, but also powerful and prolonged radiation…These characteristics render the nuclear weapon potentially catastrophic. The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilisation and the entire ecosystems of the planet’ [Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, 35]. 2.36

d) A Trident submarine can strike one third more targets more destructively that the Polaris submarines could with Chevaline and is a clear indication that the British Government do not take their legal commitments towards nuclear disarmament, as expressed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at all seriously. The ICJ stated that ’There exists and obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament’ [Advisory opinion of ICJ, 105, 2F]. 2.37 The UK has no intention of eliminating its Trident system and indeed has said in its recent Strategic Defence Review that it must perform a ’sub-strategic role’ and that they have plans to threaten to use ’low-yield’ warheads against non-nuclear ’rogue’ regimes in reprisal for attacks using chemical or biological weapons against their vital interests anywhere in the world. They also mention the plans for upgrading Trident in the medium term [UK Strategic Defence Review, July 1998 and Britain’s Strategic Defence Review: An Assessment of the Nuclear Component, Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy Retired, 1998]. 2.38 Apart from the fact that the use of nuclear weapons to protect vital interests is not permitted under international law, the UK’s refusal to disarm Trident is flouting the ICJ Opinion and Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and this represents a violation of international law too. It is in fact a Crime against Peace as defined in the Nuremburg Principle VI(a) which says that crimes against Peace are ’Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of … a war in violation of international treaties, agreements of assurances … Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned’[Nuremburg Principles]. 2.39

iv) I not only honestly believed that this crime was being committed and was imminent but in actual fact it was being committed.

There is no dispute, as far as I am aware , that there is a Trident nuclear submarine, armed with at least 48 nuclear warheads of 100 kilotons, on patrol at all times [UK Government Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, 67]. Successive British Prime Ministers (including Tony Blair) have all said that they are willing to press the button, if need be, to release the nuclear weapons. If the Court disputes these facts then I can easily call witnesses and evidence to substantiate them but they are facts in the public domain and I did not wish to waste the court’s time proving the indisputable. 2.40 These weapons can be used at any time and as a member of the public I can never know for sure when they might be used. The fact that the British Government days that their nuclear weapons are ready for use at any time means that we are all in imminent danger all the time. The fact that these weapons have never been used yet does not mean that they might not be used in the next minute. Even a cursory glance at the number and kinds of nuclear accidents that have already occurred and military misunderstandings and sudden outbreaks of conflicts and wars shows that circumstances can change very quickly indeed in this fast-moving world. 2.41 I indicated in the witness box that I have honestly believed for the last 20 years in the immorality, inhumanity and also the illegality of nuclear weapons. I showed you evidence of an advert I had had placed in my local newspaper, along with many other local people, on October 1st in 1988. Since that event, ten years ago, we have had the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ that has vindicated everything that was said about international law and nuclear weapons in that advert. I think that my words and actions over the last twenty years are enough to show I have an honest belief that gross crimes are being committed with the deployment of nuclear weapons and that these crimes are ongoing and need to be stopped before it really is too late 2.42

iv) There was a practical link between my action and the prevention of crime and the action actually helps to prevent crime.

The prevention of gross abuses of international humanitarian law such as the threat and use of nuclear weapons is complex and involves that action of very many people over a long time span. The word crime in fact is a simplification – in that it is made up of very many separate crimes. Each time one of the nuclear powers threatens to use its nuclear weapons, either in the back corridors of the UN, or in its ’secret’ dispatches or negotiations, or openly by scarcely veiled threats like we have seen in the last few months over the Iraq crisis; each time a Trident submarine goes out on patrol, or a new warhead is manufactured and then deployed; each one of these is a separate criminal offence, and one which adds up to the totality of the overall global nuclear crime that I and millions of other global citizens are trying to stop. 2.43 Simply put, the crime of threatening to use nuclear weapons and the actual deployment of British nuclear Trident missiles and warheads is ongoing and imminent and requires immediate action by global citizens to prevent. The prevention may yet take several years and many more preventative actions but this does not invalidate the imminent need for action. Just because the process of prevention is lengthy and complex and involves many people and different actions does not invalidate the separate but necessary elements of the practical crime prevention. 2.44 Actions such as ours, on the simplest level, have the power to prevent our ’leaders’ from daring to use nuclear weapons. Without such continued public pressure, leaders would often feel able to get away with even more criminal and inhumane actions that they presently do. A democratic state is not just a gift and a right, it is a responsibility as well. If citizens do not responsibly demonstrate against and resist the operation of inhumane acts by their governments then governments become increasingly corrupt. 2.45 The nuclear weapons crime is so big, so entrenched and seemingly so immovable that many of us feel totally disempowered and do not feel that we can do anything to prevent it. However, I believe that if we each do whatever we can in a peaceful and accountable manner then this will create change and prevent crime. My disarmament action with TP2000 was just such an act, small but capable of preventing crime. 2.46 My act has brought to the public’s attention the illegality of Trident deployment which has already engendered more public dissent. My act has also brought to this court’s attention the illegality of threatening to use nuclear weapons – perhaps those in court will feel able to take disarmament actions themselves or perhaps the Court will feel able to acquit us like other brave judges have in various other parts of the world. A court acquittal would strengthen the rule of law and reaffirm the underlying morality upon which it is based. 2.47 All of these acts will eventually build up and between us, they will create the change necessary to prevent nuclear crime. You may be tempted to believe that it is the Government sponsored technicians who will eventually disarm the warheads and who will prevent the crime, but I believe that they will not ever be in that position unless people like myself create the right environment and help change attitudes and empower ordinary people, governments and courts to uphold international humanitarian law and persuade finally a government to complete the disarmament work that we have started. We are all needed to play our parts in the disarmament process. 2.48

v) My action was reasonable in the circumstances and I could not do anything else effective to prevent the crime.

I would like to remind you of my testimony.. I have shown in the witness box that over many years I have lobbied extensively, made petitions, demonstrated, vigiled and done everything possible to persuade the UK Government and Military to uphold international law and to stop threatening mass destruction by disarming nuclear weapons. I have always taken due account of the rights of others and have acted in an accountable, open, safe and nonviolent manner. I have therefore shown the court that there was nothing left for me to do, other than direct disarmament, that could effectively stop the crime of deployment of weapons of mass destruction weapons. 2.49 The present Trident Ploughshares 2000 campaign, of which my disarmament actions were a part, has been particularly open and accountable having gone to the extraordinary levels of writing to the Prime Minister, Lord Advocate, and Faslane Base Commander (to mention a few of the most relevant) with details of our Pledge to Prevent Nuclear Crime, our Nonviolence and Safety Pledge, our names and addresses and having spelled out clearly what exactly we were going to do and when and where. I read to you before the content of these various Pledges [TP2000 Campaign Documents]. 2.50 We suggested that if the authorities thought that what we were doing was wrong they should charge us with conspiracy to commit an offence. There have been replies to our letters which are contained in the package of materials that I indicated to you from the witness box but no attempts to either prosecute us or prosecute the Prime Minister. This indicated not only that we are not a major threat to anyone (which was our intention being totally nonviolent) but also that the authorities do not wish to hold a major conspiracy trial that would enable the issue of the illegality of nuclear weapons to be heard in open court properly. Probably the ’authorities’ hope the problem will go away. But we will not be going away. The threat of mass destruction is too serious for us to go away yet again. 2.51 I think is quite clear that by pledging with 97 other people, from several different countries, to make continuous attempts to disarm the Trident system over an initial 20 month period of time, we have a good chance of actually being able to stop the actual use of nuclear weapons even if only for a few hours, days or weeks. More importantly the whole exercise raises public awareness and alerts the Judiciary and the Government to the untenable and dangerous misuse of power that Trident represents and enables those within the system to use their power to rectify the issue. If people like us do nothing and just stay home then there is much less likelihood that change will come about. History proves time and time again that change in society comes from pressure like our own. 2.52 The court might be tempted to say that cutting a fence could never prevent nuclear crime but it must be remembered that I was stopped before I could complete my nonviolent action which was to get aboard the Trident submarine and there do as much safe damage as I could. I was not merely cutting a fence, I was on my way to disarm a nuclear submarine. You will note that I could have attempted to blow up the whole base in order to disarm the submarines and that might superficially have given me a better defence in law, however, that would have caused the very loss of life that I am trying to stop. I am totally committed to nonviolent methods to prevent crime. This is made quite clear in our Handbook where I wrote; ’Our methods for opposing Trident must be consistent with our vision of what we would like to see in its place. Our vision is for a world which is not ruled by violence, but relies instead upon cooperation, tolerance and a willingness to seek creative outcomes to nonviolent conflict’ [Tridenting It Handbook. 1998. 1-3]. 2.53 The prosecution have not shown that I had no reasonable excuse, indeed they have not even attempted to address the issue at all. The prosecution have looked so narrowly at our actions and at the law that they have made a mockery of the whole legal system. To apply some byelaws and a minor criminal damage law to people who are attempting to prevent mass murder, criminal activities that are on a qualitatively much larger scale, and to continually refuse to address the bigger picture is either stupidity or duplicity but is certainly not justice and certainly not in the public interest. 2.54 I therefore put to the court that I should be acquitted because I was trying to prevent a greater crime which is a reasonable excuse when charged with offences against property.

3. International Law Defence that authorises individuals to act in order to prevent the commission of crimes recognised under international law. 3.0 It is every citizen’s right and duty to try and uphold international taw and to prevent war crimes and my acts of disarmament were designed to do just that.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the chief exponent of customary international law with regard to fundamental human rights is of relevance here. The preamble says:- ’The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind shall strive…by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction’ [Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 948] The rights then outlined in the Charter are impossible to reconcile with the use of nuclear weapons. For instance to look at just the first Article where we are all asked to act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood, it is obvious that this is impossible if we threaten indiscriminate mass destruction. 3.1 I therefore have a peaceful privilege, if not duty, under this UN Declaration of Human Rights, to effect adherence by the UK Government and military to this declaration. 3.2 The Nuremburg Charter also authorises me to act in order to prevent the commission of crimesrecognised under international law. The International Military Tribunal, faced with the contention that international law provided no punishment for individuals, held as follows: ’That international law imposed duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as states has long been recognised…Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced…The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations…is whether moral choice was in fact possible’ [Judgement of the Nuremburg International Tribunal, 41 American Journal of International Law 12, at 175, 1947 – Boyle p26]. 3.3 This duty derives from Article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and Article 4 of the Draft Code which both state, that the fact that the defendant ’acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility’ in international law. 3.4 Similarly, in the trial of German industrialists for war crimes committed during World War II, the Tribunal stated with respect to private individuals, ’International law, as such, binds every citizen just as does ordinary municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal when done be an officer of the government are criminal when done by a private individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not in quality. The offender in either case is charged with personal wrong and punishment falls on the offender in propria persona. The application of international law to individuals is no novelty’ [The Flick case, VI Trials of War Criminals, 1952 – p.237 Boyle]. Let me remind the court that German businessmen who provided the Zyklon B gas that was used in the gas chambers in Nazi Germany were eventually found guilty and sentenced to death for their breaches of international law [the Zyklon B Case, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals vol 1 p93, London 1947]. 3.5 We contend that if international law punishes individuals for complicity in the commission of war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and offences against the peace and security of mankind, by inference, international law must authorise acts taken to prevent those crimes. To go back to the German industrialists who were found guilty after they had helped to kill thousands of people, it is quite obvious that any individual who had tried to prevent the gas from reaching the chambers, even if she had caused some property destruction, would have been acting lawfully. 3.6 Justice Jackson, Chief Prosecutor in the 1945 Nuremburg War Crimes Trial, clearly establishes that the Nuremburg Principles binds citizens, ’The very essence of the Nuremburg Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state’ [6 F.R.D. 69, 110, 1946 – p.237 Boyle]. 3.7 The Tokyo War Cries Tribunal went so far as to declare, ’Anyone with knowledge of illegal activity and an opportunity to do something about it is a potential criminal under international law unless the person takes affirmative measures to prevent the commission of crimes’ [Tokyo War Crimes Trial Decision. p.237 – Boyle]. 3.8 I thus had a duty to take affirmative action under international law, the reasonable exercise of which made my disarmament action lawful. Accordingly, I contend that under international law I have a positive duty to take such steps as are reasonable and necessary to prevent the commission of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law and that this duty is supreme vis-a-vis the domestic law of any state, which includes Scotland. 3.9 If the principle of individual responsibility for offences against international law or complicity in those offences, does not infer a positive duty to act to prevent them, it must at least imply a right to take such steps as are reasonably calculated to bring about that end. 3.10 The ICJ has confirmed that the Nuremburg Charter applies to nuclear weapons, thus it is my right, if not my duty, to uphold the law relating to nuclear weapons and of military personnel to obey it even if given a contrary order by a superior or by his or her national government [Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, 80]. 3.11 Therefore I had a right, if not a duty, to try to uphold international law and prevent grave breaches of international humanitarian law by attempting to enter Faslane Base with the intention of disarming Trident. 3.12 I therefore ask the court to acquit me under international law on the ground that I was trying to prevent grave breaches of international law.

4. Moral Defence that is ours as a right as human beings. 4.0 Killing children is wrong. Threatening mass destruction is wrong. The murder of innocent civilians is wrong. Long-lasting radioactive contamination of the environment that will effect the unborn generations of all living beings is wrong. Nuclear weapons are wrong. 4.1 As a human being, I cannot stand by and listen to the articulate and clever rationalisations of nuclear strategists and politicians who try to convince us all that we need to threaten mass terror and annihilation to protect ourselves from others threatening us with mass terror and annihilation. 4.2 There will always be conflicts and if the human race and indeed all life on this planet is to survive then we must find reasonable ways to resolve these conflicts. If we wish to live in peace and without enemies then we must listen to our enemies and take away all causes for enmity, not try to silence them with threats of mass destruction which just keeps the endless cycle of violence spinning. 4.3 Because nuclear weapons are wrong, I have pledged to do all I can in a peaceful and responsible way to try to prevent their use and to encourage the whole process of nuclear disarmament. My action on 20th August 1998 was part of this overall commitment. 4.4 You cannot convince me that cutting a fence, entering into a Protected Area, trying to peacefully, accountably, safely and nonviolently disarm a terroristic weapon of mass destruction and long-lasting devastation is wrong. To be fully human I have no choice but to love and respect all life on earth and to prevent all violence and thus to do all in my power to disarm weapons of mass destruction. I urge you to follow your own humanity to shine forth and to find me Not Guilty on all charges.

References. 1. Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice plus all appended Separate ad Dissenting Opinions.

2. UK Government Strategic Defence Review, July 1998.

3. Trident Ploughshares 2000 Campaign Documents including Open Letter to Blair, Letter to Lord Advocate, Various Pledges.

4. Tridenting It Handbook, 1998.

5. Criminal Law of Scotland, G.H. Gordon, 2nd Edition, 1978.

6. Taming Shiva: Applying International Law to Nuclear Operations, Dunlap, Airforces Review, 1997.

7. Adomnan’s Law of the Innocents, Gilbert Marcus OP, 1997.

8. A legal History of Scotland, David M. Walker, 1988, p.12.

9. Geneva Convention Additional Protocol 1, 1977, Articles 76 and 77.

10. Can Trident Missiles be Lawfully Used in Light of the Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Case?, Lord Murray, May 1998.

11. Principles of Public International Law, Ian Brownlie, 1979, 3rd Edition, pp.45.

12. Statue of the ICJ, annexed to the UN Charter, Article 38 (1).

13. International Law: Case Materials, Bishop pp 1014-5.

14. 89 American Journal of International Law 554, 1995, T. Meron.

15. UN Doc. No. A/CONF.183/9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

16. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia, Article 7(1)

17. Documents on the Laws of War, Roberts and Guelff.

18. Shroder Case

19. Letter to Angie Zelter of 23/10/97 from Hazel Finch of the Ministry of Defence.

20. Tactical Trident, the Rifkind Doctrine and the Third World, Milan Rai.

21. The Medical Consequences of Trident, Douglas Holdstock, 1998.

22. Britain’s Strategic Defence Review: An Assessment of the Nuclear Component, Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy Retired, 1998.

23. Nuremburg Principles.

24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

25. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 8 and Draft Code Article 4.

26. Zyklon B Case, Hamburg, March 1946, Law Reports of Trial and War Criminals, vol. 1, p93 (London 1947.

27. Defending Civil Resistance under International Law, Francis Boyle.

Cases. MacDougall v Yuk-Sun Ho (1985 S.C.C.R. 199)

Mortensen v Peters (1906 S.L.T. 227)

Moss v Howdle (1997 S.C.C.R 215)